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1 Introduction
Two sets of stylized facts characterise the public sector employment and wage policy, re-
garding their size and heterogeneity across skills. First, public sector employment and wages
always stand out as major components, whether one looks at the labour market or govern-
ment budget. Governments of OECD countries account for 18 percent of total employment
and their wage bills represent more than half of their government consumption expenditures.
Perhaps less known is the policy heterogeneity across the skill dimension. The public sector
predominantly hires skilled workers. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the government
employs 37 percent of college graduates, but only 17 percent of workers with lower qual-
ifications. The pay rates also vary across workers. Researchers estimate that the public
sector wage premium, although positive on average, differs across education groups. Less
educated individuals are paid a high premium, while more educated individuals receive a
lower premium.1 Finally, adding to the wage compression observed across education levels,
a wage compression also exists within education categories, with the bottom quantile having
higher premium and the top quantile having lower or even negative premium.2
This paper builds a quantitative macro model with search and matching frictions that
incorporates these stylized facts. With labour market frictions the loose relation between
public and private sector pay creates distortions in the labour market. Higher public sector
wages create queues for those jobs, while lower wages generate recruitment problems. It
also alters the incentives of the government on which type of workers to hire. These distor-
tions affect the equilibrium unemployment rate. I use the model to evaluate a reform that
strengthen the link with private sector wages across workers. I consider this reform because
the equality of public sector wages with the private sector is the implicit wage policy in any
1This was found in the United States by Katz and Krueger (1991), in the United Kingdom by Postel-
Vinay and Turon (2007) or Disney and Gosling (1998) and in several European countries by Christofides
and Michael (2013), Castro, Salto, and Steiner (2013) and Giordano, Depalo, Coutinho Pereira, Euge´ne,
Papapetrou, Pe`rez, Reiss, and Roter (2011).
2This was found in Poterba and Rueben (1994) for the United States, Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007),
or Disney and Gosling (1998) for the United Kingdom or Mueller (1998) for Canada.
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model with a frictionless labour market.
Given the heterogeneity across skills, it is surprising that most theoretical literature on
public employment has ignored this dimension by assuming homogeneous workers. Examples
that consider a labour market without frictions include: Finn (1998), Algan, Cahuc, and Zyl-
berberg (2002) and Ardagna (2007). Papers that consider search and matching frictions in-
clude Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Ho¨rner, Ngai, and Olivetti (2007), Burdett (2012) or more
recently Michaillat (2014), Gomes (2015) and Afonso and Gomes (2014). Attempts to model
heterogeneity include Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2017), Albrecht, Robayo-Abril, and
Vroman (2017) and Domeij and Ljungqvist (2016). Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2017)
consider a setting where homogeneous workers receive different wages ex-post, due to search
frictions, and examine how public policies affect the distribution of wages and employment
in the private sector. Albrecht, Robayo-Abril, and Vroman (2017) consider heterogeneous
human capital and match specific productivity in a Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides model.
Domeij and Ljungqvist (2016) study how the public employment hiring of skilled and un-
skilled workers in Sweden and the US can explain the different evolutions of the skill premium
in the two countries. Two reasons motivate me to introduce worker heterogeneity.
In a simple RBC model, as in Finn (1998), even if the productivity differs across sectors,
identical workers receive the same wage due to arbitrage. With frictions, the labour market
tolerates different wages. Gomes (2015) examines the optimal wage policy in the context
of a stylized two-sector search and matching model. If the government sets a high wage,
it induces too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, thus, reducing private
sector job creation and increasing unemployment. Conversely, if it sets a lower wage, few
unemployed want a public sector job and the government faces recruitment problems. The
heterogeneous public sector wage premium suggests that we may have the two inefficiencies
operating simultaneously, with long queues and high unemployment for unskilled workers
and recruitment problems for high-ability skilled workers.
The second reason stems from the recent experience of European countries subject to
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Figure 1: Government wage bill and employment in 2008, OECD countries
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austerity packages. Figure 1 displays the government’s wage bill as a fraction of the private
sector wage bill and the size of government employment relative to private sector employ-
ment, of OECD countries in 2008, calculated using aggregate data. Six countries stand out
for having a high public sector wage bill relative to their level of public employment: Greece,
Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. These countries would end up in the centre of
the Euro area crisis due their poor public finances and sclerotic labour markets. Regardless
of whether public sector employment was part of the problem, it was certainly seen as part
of the solution. The implemented austerity measures included public sector wage cuts. How-
ever, most governments opted for asymmetric cuts, centered on the highest earners, instead
of reforms aligning the wage distribution with that of the private sector.3 Although the cuts
reduced spending, they did not correct inefficiencies at the bottom and probably exacerbated
inefficiencies at the top.
I set up a two-sector search and matching model and introduce worker heterogeneity along
3In Portugal in 2012, the wage cuts were 22 percent on the highest earners and zero percent on the
lowest. In Spain in 2010, they were 10 percent on top and zero at the bottom. In Ireland in 2010, the cuts
where 15 percent at the top and 5 percent at the bottom.
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two dimensions: education and ability. I consider heterogeneous ability for two reasons.
First, as previously stated, the public sector wage premium also varies within education
groups. Second, such inclusion acknowledges the common argument that public sector wage
cuts limit the scope of governments to hire high-ability workers. Nickell and Quintini (2002)
document the fall in relative pay of British public sector workers during the 1980s and find
that men entering the public sector had significantly lower test score positions compared
with public sector entrants in the previous decade.
Instead of deriving the optimal policy in a stylized setting, as in Gomes (2015), this paper
aims to quantitatively assess the gains of a reform that embodies the principle that public
wage should be linked to the private sector. To do it, the model features several realistic
elements. Instead of a social planner, the model features a government that provides an
exogenous amount of services. Taking the wage schedule as given, the government decides
the number and type of workers to hire to minimize the cost of providing those services.
The endogenous choice of the number and type of government workers to hire plays an
important role and is novel to this paper. I also include capital stock, distortionary taxes
and an idiosyncratic preference for the public sector, all quantitatively relevant. The model
is calibrated for the United Kingdom. I use the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 1996 to
2006 to calibrate the parameters related to the worker heterogeneity, labour market and
wages.
I measure the steady-state effects of a pay review covering different types of public sec-
tor workers on the following variables: the equilibrium unemployment rate, the level and
composition of the public sector worker pool, total government spending and welfare. Wage
cuts of skilled workers can reduce spending, but up to a limit. If the cuts are too severe,
they actually increase government spending and reduce welfare. As the government lowers
the pay of skilled workers too severely, it faces recruitment problems. To maintain its ser-
vices, the government spends more to recruit a skilled worker and substitutes hiring towards
unskilled workers. Cuts above 6 percent of skilled wages are welfare-reducing. On the other
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hand, wage cuts of unskilled government employees reduce both the unemployment rate and
government spending. A seven percent cut reduces the unemployment rate by more that
1.1 percentage points. A large wage premium at the bottom, makes these workers expensive
compared to their productivity. A government that minimizes costs neglects these work-
ers in favour of more productive workers that are relatively cheaper. By decompressing the
wages, the government hires more unskilled workers, reducing their unemployment rate. The
overall reform that sets equal pay, reduces the unemployment rate by 1.4 percentage points
and raises welfare by 1 percent. If the government savings are used to reduce distortionary
income taxes the effects are even larger, with a reduction of the unemployment rate of 2.1
percentage points.
The proposed policy resembles the one followed by Nordic countries. During the 1970’s
and 1980’s, these countries reformed the public sector, simultaneously reducing the wage
premium, particularly of the unskilled and employing more of these workers; see Domeij
and Ljungqvist (2016) for Sweden and Pederson, Schmidt-Sorensen, Smith, and Westergard-
Nielsen (1990) for Denmark. The policy allowed these countries to have large public sectors
without asphyxiating the private sector and to maintain low levels of unemployment.
2 Model with search and matching frictions
The model extends Gomes (2015) in some realistic dimensions. It adds heterogeneous workers
to capture the stylized facts on heterogeneity discussed in the introduction. It features
capital accumulation because capital-skill complementarity is an important determinant of
productivity differences across workers.
Instead of following the optimal policy as in Gomes (2015), the government takes the
wage schedule as given. It chooses how many workers of different types to hire to guarantee
the provision of a certain level of services, while minimizing the cost of providing those
services. It finances its spending with a distortionary income tax. I set up the model in a
6
dynamic setting but the main exercise is steady-state comparative statics. The transition
dynamics are shown in a Companion Appendix and discussed in Section 5.2.
2.1 General setting
The economy has two sectors j ∈ {p, g}. Public sector variables are denoted by the super-
script g and private sector variables by p. Time is discrete and denoted by t. There is no
uncertainty. The economy is populated by a measure one of workers. Workers differ ex-ante
from each other, with all workers falling into one of four categories i ∈ {h¯, h, µ¯, µ}, with two
dimensions of heterogeneity. The first dimension is education, with skilled workers (college
degree) denoted by h and unskilled (below college degree) workers denoted by µ. Within
each group, there are workers with higher ability, (h¯, µ¯), and others with lower ability (h, µ).
The productivity of workers of type i is denoted by zi, with zh¯ > zh and zµ¯ > zµ. The mass
of workers of type i is ϑi, with
∑
i ϑ
i = 1.
For each type, a fraction of workers are unemployed (uit), whilst the remaining are working
either in the public (lg,it ) or private (l
p,i
t ) sector.
1 = lp,it + l
g,i
t + u
i
t, ∀i. (1)
Total unemployment is denoted by ut =
∑
i ϑ
iuit. The presence of search and matching
frictions prevent some unemployed individuals from finding jobs, see Pissarides (2000). The
evolution of employment of type i in sector j depends on the number of new matches mj,it
and on job separations. In each period, jobs are destroyed at rate λj,i, which potentially
differs across sectors and types.
lj,it+1 = (1− λj,i)lj,it +mj,it , ∀ji. (2)
I assume that the markets are segmented and independent across types. This assump-
tion is worth discussing. While employers can easily observe potential employees’ length of
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education from their CVs, this is not necessarily the case with ability. We have to state
whether it is observable ex-ante by the employer or it is private information. If ability is un-
observable, low-ability workers can apply to high-ability jobs, breaking down an equilibrium
with segmented markets. I want to abstract from the complications arising from asymmet-
ric information. I rely on previous papers on adverse selection with labour market frictions,
such as Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) or Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Gomes (2017). These
papers argue that firms can design mechanisms such that workers self-select into the correct
segment.4 Section 2.4 explains why assuming observable types is not a problem.
I assume that the unemployed can direct their search to the private or public sectors.
This assumption finds support in micro-econometric evidence and was discussed in length in
Gomes (2015). Together with the assumption of segmented markets, it allows new matches
to be expressed with the following matching functions:
mj,it = m
j,i(uj,it , v
j,i
t ), ∀ji. (3)
I assume that the unemployed choose the sector in which they concentrate their search;
thus, uj,it represents the number of unemployed of type i searching in sector j. Vacancies in
each segment are denoted by vj,it . An important part of the analysis focuses on the behaviour
of those unemployed specifically searching for public sector jobs, defined as: sit ≡ u
g,i
t
uit
. We
also define qj,it as the probability of filling a vacancy of type i in sector j and f
j,i
t as the
job-finding rate of an unemployed of type i conditional on searching in sector j:
qj,it =
mj,it
vj,it
, f j,it =
mj,it
uj,it
, ∀ji.
4In Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) this is done by contracts specifying the hours worked. Assuming
that high-ability workers have lower disutility of work, firms post a contract specifying a higher wage and
more hours, which excludes the low-ability type. I follow the setting of Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Gomes (2017).
They assume that the output of a match depends on the capital supplied by firms and that firms and workers
bargain over wages. Firms specify a capital plan ex-ante. With capital-skill complementarity, the low-ability
worker does not have an incentive to apply to high-ability jobs, as it implies too much capital, and hence
lower wages. These mechanisms would not apply to the public sector. However, in many countries it is
required an entry exam to the public sector that can give information on the ability of the worker.
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This setting relies on two other assumptions. First, as in Albrecht, Robayo-Abril, and
Vroman (2017), I abstract from on-the-job search and direct transitions between sectors.
According to LFS data, in the UK in any given quarter, only 0.25 percent of workers in the
private sector move to the public sector without a measured spell of unemployment. This
represents less than 30 percent of all inflows into the public sector. Although these flows
are not negligible, the large majority of public sector workers are hired directly from non-
employment. See Bradley, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2017) for a model that incorporates
explicitly transitions between sectors. Second, I assume that the labour market friction
parameters are exogenous. One could argue that some parameters, such as separation rates
or matching elasticities, might respond to changes in the public sector wage, so that these
indirect effects might mitigate or reinforce the outcome of the reform.
2.2 Representative household
Following Merz (1995), I assume that household members pool their income so private con-
sumption is equalised across members. This is a common assumption in the literature to
maintain a representative agent framework in the presence of unemployment. Without this
risk sharing assumption, risk-averse workers with different employment histories would accu-
mulate different levels of wealth. As the wealth distribution is not relevant to our problem,
I prefer to retain the representative agent framework. The household is infinitely lived and
has the following preferences:
∞∑
t=0
βt[u(ct) + ν(ut)], (4)
where ct is the consumption good produced by the wholesale sector. The household also
derives utility from members who are unemployed ν(ut), which captures the value of leisure
and home production. β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The budget constraint in period t
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is given by
ct +Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + (1− τt)
(
rtKt +
∑
j
∑
i
ϑiwj,it l
j,i
t
)
+ χgut + Πt, (5)
The household can save by accumulating capital stock Kt. The capital stock depreciates at
a rate δ and can be rented to firms at a rental rate of rt. The second source of income is
labour income, with wj,it being the wage rate from the members of type i working in sector
j. Unemployed members collect unemployment benefits χg. The household pays a tax τt on
both its labour and capital income. Finally, Πt encompasses the lump-sum taxes or transfers
from the government and possible net profits from the private sector firms.
The household chooses the sequence of {ct, Kt+1}∞t=0 to maximise the expected utility
subject to the sequence of budget constraints, taking taxes and prices as given. The solution
is the Euler equation:
uc(ct) = β(1− δ + rt+1(1− τt+1))uc(ct+1), (6)
The agents in this economy discount the future with βt,t+T = β
T [uc(ct+T )
uc(ct)
], equal to βT in
steady-state.
2.3 Workers
The unweighted value of each member of type i to the household depends on their current
state. The values of being employed are:
W j,it = (1− τt)wj,it + βt,t+1[(1− λj,i)W j,it+1 + λj,iU it+1], ∀i, j, (7)
The value of being employed in a specific sector depends on the current net wage, (1−τt)wj,it ,
as well as the continuation value of the job, which depends on the separation probability.
Under the assumption of direct search, those unemployed are searching for a job in either
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the private or public sectors, with value functions given by
U j,it =
νu(ut)
uc(ct)
+ χb + βt,t+1[f
j,i
t W
j,i
t+1 + (1− f j,it )U it+1], ∀i, j. (8)
As in Hall and Milgrom (2008), the unemployed collect unemployment benefits χb and con-
tribute to home production (marginal utility from unemployment relative to the marginal
utility of consumption). The continuation value of being unemployed and searching in a
particular sector depends on the probability of finding a job and the value of working in that
sector. I assume that each unemployed member decides on which sector to search according
to the following condition:
Up,it = U
g,i
t + γ
i
t, ∀i. (9)
Optimality implies that movement between the two segments guarantees no additional gain
for searching in one sector vis-a`-vis the other. To this condition, I add, γit, a random
variable with cumulative distribution Γ, which stands for an idiosyncratic relative preference
(or distaste) for searching in the public sector. In each period all the unemployed draw γit
and decide where to search. One can interpret this variable as incorporating all the extra
factors that affect the decision of the unemployed of where to search for a job, including
potential additional time costs of applying to the public sector, i.e. preparing for an exam.
This is a shortcut, but a quantitatively important one. Without it, as in Gomes (2015), small
changes in relative wages generate implausibly large swings in the fraction of unemployed
searching in the public sector. With this distribution of preferences, even if the government
pays low wages, workers with strong preferences for the public sector would still apply for
jobs there.5 Γ puts discipline on the fluctuations on sit, that are given in equilibrium by
sit = 1− Γ(γi,∗t ), ∀i, (10)
5Artuc¸, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) argue that wage differentials alone cannot explain several facts
about mobility. The idiosyncratic shock is crucial to a realistic treatment of worker mobility.
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where γi,∗t is the cut-off point of the distribution for type i at time t. All unemployed
household members with preferences above the cut-off will search for jobs in the public
sector, while the ones below search in the private sector. This threshold is given by
γi,∗t = f
p,i
t βt,t+1[W
p,i
t+1 − U it+1]− f g,it βt,t+1[W g,it+1 − U it+1], ∀i. (11)
An increase in the value of employment in the public sector, driven by either wage increase
or decrease in the separation rate, raises st until no extra gain exists for searching in that
sector. However, the marginal searcher has a lower preference for the public sector. In each
period there is a wedge between the two values of unemployment. The ex-ante value of being
unemployed is given by:
U it = (1− sit)Up,it + sitU g,it +
∫
γi,∗t
γitΓ(γ
i
t)dγ
i
t, ∀i. (12)
2.4 Intermediate goods producers
There is a large continuum of firms that produce one of four types of intermediate goods
xit, which is sold at price p
x,i
t . Firms open vacancies in a given sub-market i. If the vacancy
is filled, the firm is matched to a type-i worker and produces x(a, zi, kit), where a is an
aggregate productivity and kit is the capital used in the match, rented at rate rt. The
production technology x(·, ·, ·) is increasing and concave in all its arguments with a positive
cross partial derivative of capital and skill. The value of a job is given by
J it = max
kit
[px,it x(a, z
i, kit)− wp,it − rp,it kit + βt,t+1[(1− λp,i)J it+1], ∀i. (13)
For each match, the firm chooses every period how much capital it rents. The optimal level
of capital k∗it solves the first-order condition:
px,it xk(a, z
i, k∗it ) = rt, ∀i. (14)
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Therefore, we can write the value of a job as
J it = [p
x,i
t x(a, z
i, k∗it )− wp,it − rp,it k∗it + βt,t+1[(1− λp,i)J it+1], ∀i. (15)
The value of opening a vacancy for type i is given by
V it = −κp,i + βt,t+1[qp,it J it+1 + (1− qp,it )V it+1], ∀i, (16)
where κp,i is the cost of posting a vacancy. The number of firms is determined in equilibrium
by free entry:
V it = 0, ∀i. (17)
The surplus from the match is shared by the firm and workers as wages are the outcome
of Nash bargaining:
wp,it = arg max
wp,it
(W p,it − U it)b(J it )1−b, ∀i. (18)
where b denote the worker’s bargaining power. The solution is given by
(W p,it − U it ) =
b(1− τt)
1− bτt (W
p,i
t − U it + J it ), ∀i. (19)
With distortionary taxes, the share of the surplus going to workers is lower than their
bargaining power. For every unit that the firm gives up in favour of the worker, the pair
lose a fraction τt to the government. Therefore, they economise on their tax payments by
agreeing to a lower wage.6
Notice that, from Equation (14), one capital level maximises the surplus of the match, and
hence wages. Given the capital-skill complementarity, the optimal level of capital increases
with ability, provided the price of the good is not decreasing in ability, which is guaranteed
6If firms also paid taxes on their profits, the total surplus of the match would be independent of the tax
rate that would not affect the bargaining power of workers. In that scenario, the tax rate would not distort
the wage setting process in the private sector and would only affect the accumulation of capital.
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in the numerical exercise. This ensures that, even if ability was not observable, we could
design a separating equilibrium. If firms commit to supplying a capital stock of the high
type in every period, low-ability workers would not pretend to have high ability. Even if
they would have a higher job-finding rate, they would be paired with too much capital for
the duration of the match, implying lower wages; see Ferna´ndez-Blanco and Gomes (2017).
2.5 Final goods producer
The representative final goods producer buys intermediate inputs in a competitive market,
produces a final good. The objective is to choose inputs to maximise profits given by
max
xt
[F (xt)−
∑
i
px,it x
i
t], (20)
where bold denotes a vector, that is, xt denotes a vector with all four intermediate inputs.
The solution is given by the first-order conditions:
F ′xi = p
x,i
t , ∀i. (21)
2.6 Government
I assume that the government needs to produce a minimum number of services, g¯. To produce
these services, the government hires different types of workers. I consider public sector wages
to be exogenous policy variables determined one period in advance when vacancies are posted.
Given a wage schedule, the government chooses the number of vacancies for each type of
worker to minimise the total cost of providing the government services. The total cost
14
encompasses the cost of recruitment and the future wage bill.
min
vg,it
∑
i
ϑiκg,ivg,it + βt,t+1[
∑
i
ϑiwg,it+1l
g,i
t+1]
s.t.
g¯ = g(lgt+1)
lg,it+1 = (1− λj,i)lg,it + qg,it vg,it , ∀i,
where g(lgt ) is the production function of government services that uses the four types of
workers, lgt . Given the level of public wages and vacancy-filling probability, the government
has to guarantee that it posts sufficient vacancies to maintain an employment level capable
of continuing providing its services. I consider a relatively myopic government that does not
care about the infinite sequence of government services and the present discounted value
of the costs. In Section 5.2 I generalize this problem and discuss the scenarios where the
government has a longer horizon (4, 8, 16 quarters and ∞).
I assume that the government does not internalize the effect its policies have on tightness.
By choosing a different composition of workers to hire, it could affect the filling probabilities
and, therefore, the hiring cost. My argument is that the government does not hire in a
centralized way. There are vacancies in different branches of government and in different
regional offices. Each one has little control over the wages and can only decide which workers
to hire to be able to provide its services. The first-order conditions of this problem are
ϑiκg,i
qg,it
+ βt,t+1[ϑ
iwg,it+1] = ξtg
′
i,t+1, ∀i, (22)
where ξt is the real multiplier of the constraint on government services and g
′
i,t is the partial
derivative of the government services with respect to government’s employment of type i
workers. This problem incorporates the two opposite forces that are important to understand
the role of public sector wages. When wages of one employee type go down, the government
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would save on the wage bill if it hired more of them. However, simultaneously, it may be
more expensive to recruit them. The overall effect depends on the tightness of the labour
market.7
The government budget constraint is given by
τt
(∑
j
∑
i
ϑilj,it w
j,i
t + rtKt
)
=
∑
i
ϑilg,it w
g,i
t +
∑
i
ϑivg,it κ
g,i + χbut + Tt + g¯
int, (23)
where Tt are lump-sum transfers and g¯
int are exogenous purchases of intermediate goods. The
costs of recruiting are external, meaning they come out of the budget constraint. Throughout
the paper, I consider two cases: one where any adjustment of the government budget is
guaranteed by changes in lump-sum transfers and the other where distortionary income tax
rate adjusts to balance the budget.
2.7 Market clearing
The market clearing conditions in the intermediate and final goods’ markets are
xit = ϑ
ilp,it x(a, z
i, kit), ∀i, (24)
Yt = F (xt) = ct + g¯
int +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt +
∑
i
∑
j
ϑivj,it κ
j,i. (25)
In this economy, the measure of GDP in the national accounts would be GDPt = F (xt) +∑
i ϑ
ilg,it w
g,i
t . The market clearing in the capital market implies that all capital is rented to
intermediate goods producers:
Kt =
∑
i
ϑikitl
p,i
t . (26)
7I have also consider an alternative setting in which the government has a budget fixed and chooses the
number and type of workers to maximize the production of the public good. The conclusions under this
setting are similar, but the gains of reducing wages are measured in terms of public sector output rather
than the reduction in the public sector wage bill and private consumption.
16
2.8 Decentralised equilibrium
Definition 1 Given a sequence of policies of public wages {wg,it , ∀i}∞t=o, unemployment
benefits χb, government services g¯, intermediate purchases g¯int and income tax τ¯ and a set
of initial conditions {K0, lp,i0 , lg,i0 , ∀i}; a decentralised equilibrium is a sequence of prices
{rt, wp,it , px,it , ∀i}∞t=o and allocations {Kt+1, Ct, kit, vp,it , vg,it , sit, ∀i}∞t=o such that:
i) household satisfies the Euler Equation (eq. 6); ii) unemployed members of type i choose
which sector to search (eq. 9); iii) matched intermediate goods’ firms choose optimal capital
for each type (eq. 14); iv) free entry of intermediates goods’ firms (eq. 17); v) private
sector wages are the outcome of Nash bargaining (eq. 19); vi) final good representative firm
maximizes profits (eq. 21); vii) government minimizes the cost of producing services (eq.
22); viii) lump-sum taxes balance the budget (eq. 23); ix) intermediate goods, final good and
capital markets clear (eq. 24-26).
3 Calibration
To solve the model, I consider the following functional forms for the matching functions,
production functions and preferences.
u(ct) + ν(ut) =
c1−σt
1− σ + χ
uut,
mj,it = ζ
j,i(uj,it )
ηj(vj,it )
1−ηj ,∀i, j,
x(a, zi, ki) = azi(ki)α ∀i,
F (xt) =
(
Ψ((xh¯t )
% + (xht )
%)
ς
% + (1−Ψ)((xµ¯t )% + (xµt )%)
ς
%
) 1
ς
,
g(lgt+1) =
(
Φ((ϑh¯zh¯lg,h¯t+1)
%g + (ϑhzhlg,ht+1)
%g)
ςg
%g + (1− Φ)((ϑµ¯zµ¯lg,µ¯t+1)%
g
+ (ϑµzµl
g,µ
t+1)
%g)
ςg
%g
) 1
ςg
.
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I assume a CRRA utility function with a coefficient of risk aversion σ and linear utility
of unemployment. For the matching function, the matching elasticity with respect to un-
employment, ηj, can be different across sectors, but not across types, while the matching
efficiency, ζj,i, differs across sectors and education, but not ability. For the production func-
tion of individual firms, I assume an elasticity of output with respect to capital per worker
of α. The final output is produced by two nested CES functions. Both skilled and unskilled
inputs are an aggregation of low- and high-ability workers, with the parameter % determining
the elasticity of substitution between types. The final good is then produced by a CES of
the skilled and unskilled intermediate inputs with a parameter ς. Ψ governs the importance
of the skilled input in production. In the baseline calibration the government’s produc-
tion function has the same elasticity of substitution between low- and high-ability workers
(%g = %) and between skilled and unskilled inputs (ςg = ς) as the private sector.
The model is calibrated to match the UK economy on a quarterly frequency, drawing
largely on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) microdata for the period 1996-2010. Table 1 lists
all the parameters, their values and the data sources. The educational attainment of the
labour force has significantly improved over the past two decades, as documented in Gomes
(2012). I take an average of the period 1996-2010, which places the share of university
graduates at 32 percent of the population. I consider that high- and low-ability workers
have the same mass, so ϑh¯ = ϑh = 0.16 and ϑµ¯ = ϑµ = 0.34. I also report the results
assuming the share of college graduates is: i) the one at the beginning of the sample (25
percent) and ii) the one at end of the sample (40 percent).
The contribution of skilled workers to the provision of government services, Φ, and their
steady-state level g¯ are such that the government hires 37.3 percent of university graduates
and 16.7 percent of workers without a university degree. These numbers, taken from the
LFS, reflect the fact that the government predominantly hires skilled workers. Following
Gomes (2012), I construct data on worker flows to calibrate the separation rates, which I
assume are equal for workers of different abilities, but differ by education and sector. The
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numbers are λp,h = 0.012, λp,µ = 0.018, λg,h = 0.004 and λp,µ = 0.006. The private sector
has two to three times more separations than the public sector. Unskilled workers are more
likely to lose their jobs than skilled workers.
To calibrate the public sector wage premium for skilled workers, I run quantile regressions
of the log of net wages of college graduates on a dummy for the public sector. I control for:
sex, industry and occupation, status in previous quarter, tenure, age and its square, marital
status, time and region and average hours worked and its square. The sample runs from
1996 to 2006. I take the coefficients of the public sector dummy of the 25 and 75 percentiles
as the premium of the low- and high-ability skilled workers. I repeat the regressions for
non-college graduates. The steady-state public sector wages of the four types are set such
that w¯
g,h¯
w¯p,h¯
= 1.016, w¯
g,h
w¯p,h
= 1.039, w¯
g,µ¯
w¯p,µ¯
= 1.037 and w¯
g,µ
w¯p,µ
= 1.071. These numbers are consistent
with studies using micro data from the United Kingdom, such as Disney and Gosling (1998),
which document a wage compression within and across education groups. Recent papers by
Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) and Dickson, Postel-Vinay, and Turon (2014); ?, argue that
the lifetime premium in the public sector is lower than the one measured in static regressions
and that, when controlling for selection, job losses in the two sectors are very similar. As
robustness, I consider: i) a 3 percent lower premium for all types; ii) a scenario without
compression but a positive premium of 3 percent for all types and iii) equal job-separation
rates across sectors.
The United Kingdom has a unique source of data on recruitment costs by sector. Ev-
ery year, the Chartered Institute of Personal Development conducts a recruitment practice
survey covering 800 organizations ranging from manufacturing to private and public sectors
services (CIPD (2009)). The costs of recruiting a worker, which encompass advertising and
agency costs, are approximately £13000 for a skilled worker in the private sector and £8000
in the public sector, corresponding to 26 and 16 weeks of the UK median income. For a low-
skilled worker, the costs are £3500 and £2000 for private and public sectors, respectively.
The costs of posting vacancies are set to target these numbers (κp,h = 9.53, κg,h = 6.38,
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Table 1: Summary of baseline calibration
Fixed parameters fixed Source Values
Public-private wage ratio LFS w¯
g,h¯
w¯p,h¯
= 1.016, w¯
g,h
w¯p,h
= 1.039,
w¯g,µ¯
w¯p,µ¯
= 1.037, w¯
g,µ
w¯p,µ
= 1.071.
Job-separation rates LFS λg,h = 0.004, λp,h = 0.012,
λg,µ = 0.006, λp,µ = 0.018.
Weights of skilled LFS ϑh = 0.16, ϑh¯ = 0.16, ϑµ =
0.34, ϑµ¯ = 0.34.
Matching elasticities w.r.t. unemployment Gomes (2014) ηg = 0.15, ηp = 0.40.
CES elasticities Set exogenously ς = 0.0, ρ = 0.50
Steady-state income tax Standard τ¯ = 0.2
Depreciation rate Standard δ = 0.02
Discount factor Standard β = 0.99
Coefficient of relative risk aversion Standard σ = 2
Productivity Normalization a = zh = zµ¯ = 1
Other parameters Target (Source) Values
Matching efficiency Vacancy duration (CIPD) ζg,h = 0.677, ζp,h = 0.588,
ζg,u = 1.011, ζp,u = 0.956
Cost of posting vacancies Cost per hire (CIPD) κg,h = 6.376, κp,h = 9.534,
κg,u = 0.907, κp,u = 0.959
Unemployment benefits Replacement rate (EC) χg = 1.506
Unemployment utility Unemployment rate of unskilled (LFS) χu = 0.063
Bargaining power of workers Unemployment rate (LFS) b = 0.288
Weight of skilled in gov. production Public employment of skilled (LFS) Φ = 0.755
Government services Public employment of unskilled (LFS) g¯ = 0.266
Weight of skilled in production College premium (LFS) Ψ = 0.348
Market ability Residual wage dispersion (LFS) zµ = 0.557, zh¯ = 1.577
Elasticity w.r.t private capital Labour share (AMECO) α = 0.459
Gov. purchases Gov. consumption (AMECO) g¯int = 0.218
Distribution of preferences Average search and ratio of job-finding v1 = −8.283, v2 = 0.135
Note: in Section 5, the parameters in the top panel remain fixed and the parameters in the bottom panel are
recalibrated to match the new targets.
κp,µ = 0.96 and κg,µ = 0.91). The CIPD data also reports vacancy durations. It takes 14.5
weeks to hire a skilled worker in the private sector and 16 weeks in the public sector. For un-
skilled workers, it takes 5.5 weeks in the private sector, compared with 9.1 weeks in the public
sector. The matching elasticities are set to match these moments (ζg,h = 0.68, ζp,h = 0.59,
ζg,µ = 1.01 and ζp,µ = 0.96). The matching elasticities with respect to unemployment are
set to ηp = 0.4 and ηg = 0.15, estimated by Gomes (2015).
The parameter of the private production function Ψ is set to 0.35 to target a college
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premium of 40 percent, which was found by regressing the log net wages on a dummy for
college education, and average hours and its square. I normalise a = zh = zµ¯ = 1. I link the
productivity differences within skilled and unskilled workers to a measure of within-group
wage dispersion. I run a mincer regression of log net wages on several controls and retrieve
the 25-75 percentile difference of the wage residuals. The difference is 0.461 for skilled and
0.416 for unskilled workers. It is a strong assumption to consider that all the wage dispersion
is due to productivity differences. Other factors, namely, search frictions may also contribute.
Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) find that search frictions can explain 7-25 percent of
the French inter-industry differential. Tjaden and Wellschmied (2014) find that 13.7 percent
of overall wage inequality is due to the presence of search frictions. I assume that 20 percent
of the wage dispersion is due to other factors and set zh¯ = 1.58 and zµ = 0.56 to target a
wage gap between high- and low-ability of 0.368 for skilled and 0.332 for unskilled workers.
I also report the results assuming: i) all wage dispersion is due to productivity differences
and ii) only 20 percent of wage dispersion is due to productivity differences across workers.
To accurately predict the welfare and budgetary effects of public sector pay, we have to
distinguish the flow value of unemployment due to home production versus unemployment
benefits. Saloma¨ki and Munzi (1999) find that the net replacement rate is 61 percent for
low-educated workers and 49 percent for highly educated workers in the United Kingdom. I
set χb = 1.51 such that the replacement rate for a low-ability unskilled worker is 60 percent of
the net wage. It implies a replacement rate of 30 percent for the high-ability skilled workers
and of 45 percent for the remaining workers. I calibrate the utility value of unemployment
(χu = 0.06) and bargaining power of workers (b = 0.29) to target an average unemployment
rate of six percent and of 7.4 percent for unskilled workers, values extracted from the LFS.
The joint flow value of unemployment varies from 50 of the net private sector wage for a
high-ability skilled worker to 96 percent for a low-ability unskilled worker. The average is
around 70 percent, suggested by Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Regarding technology, the elasticity of output with respect to capital α is set to 0.46
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to target a labour share of 60.8 percent, the UK’s average between 1996 and 2010. As a
benchmark, I consider an elasticity of substitution of 1 across skills (ςg = ς = 0) and of 2
across abilities (%g = % = 0.5). I perform several robustness exercises varying the elasticities
of substitution, both economy wide or specific to the public sector technology: i) where
skills are substitutes (ς = 0.4, as in Krusell et al., 2000); ii) where skills are complements
(ς = −0.4); and iii) where abilities are more or less substitutes (% = 0.8 and % = 0.3). I
also consider a case where the four types of workers in the public sector are close to perfect
complements (ςg = −10 and %g = −10). In this scenario, changes in public sector wages do
not affect the type of workers hired by the government that are kept in fixed proportions.
The rest of the parameters are standard: β is set to 0.99, σ to 2 and the depreciation rate
δ to 0.02. I set the steady-state income tax equal to 0.2 and the purchase of intermediate
inputs such that total government consumption is 20 percent of GDP, the UK average from
1996 to 2010 (g¯int = 0.22). Lump-sum transfers balance the budget in steady-state.
I assume a uniform distribution of sector preference Γ, with parameters [ν1, ν2]. Given
that the search patterns of the unemployed are unobservable, there are no obvious data
sources to use. I exploit data from Google Trends as a proxy. Google Trends provides
indexes of keyword searches reflecting the instances people have “Googled” a specific word
or combination of words relative to overall traffic. These indexes are available on a weekly
basis dating back to 2004.8 I retrieved the index of keyword searches of ‘jobs’ and one that
includes several keywords related to the public sector such as ‘government jobs’, ‘council
jobs’, ‘nhs jobs’ or ‘army jobs’. The average ratio of the two indexes is 0.14. I calibrate the
two parameters of the distribution, ν1 and ν2 to match an average search of 0.14 and such
that the dispersion is equal to twice the average wage in the economy ν2− ν1 = 2× w¯. This
implies a ratio of private to public job-finding rate equal to 7.4, found in the data. I also
report the results with: i) a higher and lower level of search (s¯ = 0.2 and s¯ = 0.07) and ii)
high and low dispersion (ν2 − ν1 = 3× w¯ and ν2 − ν1 = 1× w¯).
8Researchers have used these data to forecast: financial markets, labour and housing markets, automobile
sector, inflation expectations or private consumption. See the review in Gomes and Taamouti (2016).
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4 Reforming the public sector’s wage policy
4.1 The effects of heterogeneous pay in steady-state
I start by examining the effects of progressive and regressive wage cuts. The progressive
wage cuts target skilled workers. I assume that, for each one percent cut of high-ability
wages, the wages of the low-ability are cut by 0.5 percent. Unskilled wages remain constant.
The regressive wage cuts target only unskilled workers. For each one percent cut of low-
ability wages, the wages of the high-ability are cut by 0.5 percent. Lump-sum taxes adjust
to balance the budget. Figure 2 shows the outcomes.
As the government reduces the unskilled workers’ wages (top panel), the composition
of public employment shifts from skilled to unskilled workers. Lowering wages has two
opposite effects: a wage bill effect and a recruitment effect. As workers become cheaper,
the government wants to employ more to save on the wage bill. However, offering lower
wages makes the public sector less attractive, implying that fewer unemployed search for
jobs there, making the recruitment more costly. When the government reduces unskilled
workers’ wages, the first effect dominates because unemployed workers are still queuing for
jobs in the public sector. To maintain the same level of services, the government hires more
workers, but reduces spending on the total wage bill plus recruitment costs.
The consequences in the labour market are dramatic. With an seven percent wage cut, the
unemployment rate of unskilled workers falls from 7.4 percent to 5.8 percent. Lowering wages
shifts the job searches to private sector firms, that post more vacancies. But the improvement
in the labour market cannot explain the magnitude of the unemployment reduction. The
other reason is that the unskilled wage cuts encourage the government to hire more unskilled
workers, particularly with low ability. In the baseline case, the government hires 16 percent
of these workers, but when paying lower wages it hires as much as 16.9 percent. This is
the group with the highest unemployment rate, that is reduced with the increase in hiring.
A large wage premium at the bottom, makes these workers expensive compared to their
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Figure 2: Steady-state effects of public sector wages adjustments
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Progressive public sector wage cuts: skilled wages only
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Note: model simulations under the baseline calibration. Regressive public sector wage cuts: for each 1 percent
cut in low-ability unskilled wages, the wages of the high-ability unskilled are cut by 0.5 percent. Skilled wages
are constant. Progressive public sector wage cuts: for each 1 percent cut in high-ability skilled wages, the
wages of the low-ability skilled are cut by 0.5 percent. Unskilled wages are constant.
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productivity. A government that minimizes costs neglects them in favour of more productive
workers that are relatively cheaper.
The government faces a constraint when reducing wages: they have to guarantee that
some unemployed search for public sector jobs. For the baseline calibration, if cuts of low-
ability unskilled wages are above 8 percent (4 percent for the high-ability), few unskilled
workers search in the public sector. This forces the government to turn to skilled workers
to produce its services. By hiring many skilled workers, there are fewer left for the private
sector, which reduces the demand for unskilled workers in the private sector and generates
a strong increase in their unemployment rate.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows the consequences of reducing skilled workers’ wages.
First, it shifts the composition of public employment to unskilled workers. In the case of
skilled workers wage cuts, the recruitment effect dominates the wage bill effect. By offering
too low wages, only a few devoted skilled unemployed will look for public sector jobs. The
government faces recruitment problems, making it costly to hire a skilled worker. To maintain
its services, the government hires more unskilled workers, increasing the size of the public
sector. This is a case where lowering wages have perverse effects. With wage cuts of more
than 7 percent on top earners, the total wage bill plus recruitment cost increases (bottom
right graph). They do, however, reduce the unemployment for unskilled workers.
The progressive and regressive wage cuts affect the government budget differently. Cut-
ting skilled wages allows the government to reduce its wage bill by, at most, 0.3 percent
of GDP. By cutting unskilled wages, the government can reduce it by 0.6 percent of GDP.
The response of private sector wages is also heterogeneous. Skilled wage cuts, reduce private
sector wages of the skilled but increase those of the unskilled. Unskilled wage cuts, reduce
private sector wages of the unskill, but increase those of the skilled. However, the effects are
not linear. They are stronger, when the unemployment rate is lower. The demonstration
effect of the public sector as a wage leader depends on how tight the market is.
Figure 3 shows the welfare effects of public sector wage cuts in terms of steady-state
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Figure 3: Welfare effects of public sector wages adjustments
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consumption-equivalent variations. High-ability skilled wage cuts can increase welfare, at
most, by 0.2 percent. Cuts above 6 percent do not raise welfare. On the other hand, the
regressive cuts can raise welfare by 1 percent.
4.2 Equal pay in the public sector
Let us now consider a policy reform, consisting of a review of public sector wages to have
a parity with those in the private sector across workers in the steady-state. The results are
shown in Table 2. This reform significantly lowers the unemployment rate. If the government
equates wages to those in the private sector, the aggregate unemployment rate falls by 1.4
percentage points, driven by the 1.9 (3.0) percentage points decrease in the unemployment
rate for unskilled workers (low-ability).
This reform generates savings of 0.6 percent of GDP on the government wage bill, and
of 0.9 percent of GDP if we consider further savings in unemployment benefits. Private
consumption increases by 1.4 percent and the welfare gains amount to 1.05 percent of steady-
state consumption.
Decompressing the public wages alters the composition of public employment. The gov-
ernment is able to hire more high-ability skilled workers (by 0.3 percentage points), but it
also hires more low-ability unskilled workers. The public employment of this group increases
by 1.1 percentage points, which accounts for one third of the fall in unemployment rate of
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Table 2: Steady-state effects of a reform of public sector wages
Lump-Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes
Public-private wage premium Baseline 0% 0%
Variables
Unemployment rate 0.060 0.046 0.039
Skilled 0.030 0.026 0.025
High-ability 0.022 0.019 0.018
Low-ability 0.039 0.033 0.031
Unskilled 0.074 0.055 0.046
High-ability 0.016 0.009 0.009
Low-ability 0.132 0.102 0.083
Public employment 0.233 0.236 0.236
Skilled 0.373 0.368 0.369
High-ability 0.391 0.394 0.394
Low-ability 0.355 0.343 0.343
Unskilled 0.167 0.173 0.173
High-ability 0.174 0.175 0.174
Low-ability 0.160 0.171 0.173
Consumption - +1.40% +3.02%
Welfare Gains - 1.05% 2.48%
Government∗
Wage bill 0.165 0.159 0.158
+ recruitment costs 0.165 0.160 0.159
+ unemployment benefits 0.179 0.170 0.168
Income taxes 0.2 0.2 0.188
Implied public [private] sector wage change
Skilled (high-ability) - -0.7% [0.8%] 1.2% [2.8%]
Skilled (low-ability) - -5.0% [-1.3%] -3.2% [0.5%]
Unskilled (high-ability) - -3.4% [0.2%] -1.9% [1.7%]
Unskilled (low-ability) - -7.5% [-0.9%] -7.4% [-0.9%]
Note: model simulations under the baseline calibration. ∗ given in percent of GDP.
these workers. The last rows of the table show the effects of the reform on wages in the
two sectors. This reform implies a slight increase in the private sector wage of high-ability
workers and a decline of around 1 percent of low ability wages (skilled and unskilled).
If income taxes adjust instead of lump-sum taxes, the effects are even larger. This
reform generates sufficient savings to cut the income tax by 1.2 percentage points. The
unemployment rate falls by 2.1 percentage points and welfare increases by almost 2.5 percent
of steady-state consumption. A large fraction of the gains from the reform comes from the
labour market effect, but are further amplified by the consequent tax reduction.
In Gomes (2015) I discussed the optimal public sector wage policy in a simple setting.
I showed that wages should be lower than in the private sector, to compensate for job
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security and the differences in the labour market frictions. The optimal policy problem in
this setting is complicated, with tax distortions and externalities across different workers
and sectors adding to the congestion and thick market externalities. Hence, I evaluate the
welfare gains of this simple reform that can be realistically implemented and moves in the
direction of optimality. I could have examined the welfare gains from other policies with
distinct premia for different types of workers, but type-contingent reforms are difficult to
justify without computing the optimal policy.
5 Further results
5.1 Robustness
Table 3 shows that the previous quantitative results are robust to different calibrations. I
consider scenarios with a wide range of technological parameters, different levels and dis-
persion of preferences for public sector jobs, different magnitudes of heterogeneity in ability
and different shares of college graduates. I also consider a scenario with equal job-separation
rates across sectors, a premium 3 percent below baseline for all types of workers and one with
no wage compression in the public sector. For each scenario, the model was re-calibrated
according to Section 3. For most of the alternative calibrations, the steady-state reform that
equates the public sector wages to their private sector counterparts, reduces unemployment
rate between 0.6 and 1.9 percentage points if taxes are lump-sum and between 1 and 2.5
percentage points if taxes are distortionary. The welfare gains are, in all cases, positive and
can be as high as 3 percent of steady-state consumption.
The results are more sensitive if we consider different baseline public sector wage premia.
If the baseline premium is scaled down by 3 percent, the reform still reduces the unem-
ployment rate by 0.7 or 0.9 percentage points, depending on the financing. Without wage
compression and a 3 percent premium for all workers, the reform achieves an unemployment
reduction of 1.1 or 1.7 percentage points. When the model is calibrated to match that only
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Table 3: Effects of the reform in steady-state, robustness
Lump-sum taxes Distortionary taxes
Scenario Unemployment Consumption Welfare Unemployment Consumption Welfare
rate rate
Elasticity of substitution between skills [both sectors]
ς = 0.4 -1.5pp 1.4% 1.0% -2.2pp 3.0% 2.5%
ς = −0.4 -1.3pp 1.4% 1.1% -2.0pp 3.0% 2.5%
Elasticity of substitution between skills [only public sector]
ςg = 0.4 -1.5pp 1.4% 1.0% -2.2pp 3.0% 2.4%
ςg = −0.4 -1.4pp 1.4% 1.1% -2.0pp 3.0% 2.5%
Elasticity of substitution between abilities [both sectors]
% = 0.8 -1.6pp 1.6% 1.2% -2.5pp 3.6% 2.9%
% = 0.3 -1.3pp 1.3% 1.0% -1.9pp 2.8% 2.3%
Elasticity of substitution between abilities [only public sector]
%g = 0.8 -1.6pp 1.6% 1.2% -2.3pp 3.2% 2.6%
%g = 0.3 -1.4pp 1.4% 1.0% -2.1pp 3.0% 2.5%
Perfect complements [only public sector]
ςg = −10, %g = −10 -1.1pp 1.3% 1.0% -1.8pp 3.1% 2.6%
Search in the public sector
s¯ = 0.07 -0.2pp 0.2% 0.1% -0.6pp 1.1% 1.0%
s¯ = 0.21 -2.0pp 2.0% 1.5% -2.8pp 4.0% 3.3%
Dispersion in preferences for public sector
ν2 − ν1 = 3× w¯ -1.7pp 1.7% 1.3% -2.5pp 3.4% 2.8%
ν2 − ν1 = 1× w¯ -0.6pp 0.6% 0.5% -1.2pp 1.9% 1.6%
Share of skilled workers
ϑh¯ = ϑh = 0.125 -1.9pp 1.7% 1.2% -2.8pp 3.7% 3.0%
ϑh¯ = ϑh = 0.20 -1.1pp 1.2% 0.9% -1.7pp 2.5% 2.1%
Heterogeneity in ability
w¯p,¯i
w¯p,i = 1.09− 1.08 -1.5pp 1.8% 1.3% -2.4pp 3.9% 3.2%
w¯p,¯i
w¯p,i = 1.46− 1.42 -1.4pp 1.4% 1.0% -2.1pp 2.9% 2.4%
Lower average premium
Baseline-3% -0.7pp 0.7% 0.6% -0.9pp 1.2% 1.0%
No dispersion in premium
Premium=3% -1.1pp 1.1% 0.8% -1.7pp 2.5% 2.1%
Equal job-separation rates across sectors
λg,h = 0.012, λg,µ = 0.017 -1.1pp 1.2% 0.9% -1.8pp 2.8% 2.3%
Note: model simulations under alternative calibrations. For each scenario the model was re-calibrated accord-
ing to Section 3. The table reports the steady-state change of implementing a zero public sector wage premium
for all workers relative to baseline of: unemployment rate (percentage points), consumption (percent) and
welfare (percent of consumption equivalent variation).
7 percent of the unemployed are searching in the public sector prior to the reform, than
the gains are lower but still positive (a reduction of 0.2 to 0.6 percentage points of the
unemployment rate).
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5.2 Transition and extensions
I further analyse the robustness of the results by carrying out three other exercises, that
are shown in a Companion Appendix. First, I compute the transition dynamics after the
reform. Most of the effect on unemployment occurs within two years. The savings on the
government wage bill occur in the first periods. Along the transition, all wages in the private
sector fall, but after three years the high skill wages are already above the initial steady-state.
Considering the transition, the welfare gains of the reform are 0.66 percent of steady-state
consumption, compared to the 1.05 percent if we only compare steady-state utilities.
Second, I redo the exercise but fixing the aggregate stock of capital. With lump-sum
taxes, the effects on the unemployment rate are only marginally lower than in the benchmark
case (a fall of 1.3pp instead of 1.4pp) but there are lower welfare gains (0.57 instead of 1.05
percent). A large part of the gains from reducing distortionary taxation comes from capital
accumulation. When we shut down this channel, the gains of a tax cut only work through
the wage bargaining. Unemployment rate only falls by 1.6 percentage points instead of 2.1
in the benchmark case, and the wages in the two sectors fall by more.
Finally, I analyse the role of the government horizon by generalizing the government
problem to:
min
vg,it
∑
i
ϑiκg,ivg,it +
T∑
l=1
βt,t+l
[∑
i
ϑi(1− λj,i)(l−1)wg,it+llg,it+l
]
s.t.
g¯ = g(lgt+1)
lg,it+1 = (1− λj,i)lg,it + qg,it vg,it , ∀i, t = 1, ...T.
where T represents the time horizon of the government that considers the cost of recruitment
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and the future wage bills. The first order conditions are:
ϑiκg,i
qg,it
+
T∑
l=1
βt,t+l(1− λj,i)(l−1)[ϑiwg,it+l] = ξtg′i,t+1, ∀i, (27)
In the benchmark case I considered the government to be myopic with an horizon of T = 1.
I have also considered with T = 4, T = 8, T = 16 and T =∞. In all cases, the model is re-
calibrated as discussed in Section 3. The different horizons do not affect the average public
sector employment and unemployment rate of skilled and unskilled workers that are targets
in the calibration, but marginally affect them for high and low ability. The impact of the
reform on unemployment is essentially unchanged with the horizon. However, the horizon
dies matter for the consumption and welfare gains. When the government has an horizon of
4 years, the welfare gains of the reform are 1.32 compared to 1.05 in the benchmark case.
5.3 Reform of public sector wages and inequality
One valid concern about this reform is its impact on inequality. Although the representative
agent framework is not the most suitable for this type of analysis, it can provide some
insights. I compute the labour market value of each type of worker as the weighted average
of the value of being in each of the three states:
Ωit = l
p,i
t W
p,i
t + l
g,i
t W
g,i
t + u
i
tU
i
t , ∀i. (28)
This equation gives the contribution to the household of each type of worker and it would
be the welfare measure under linear utility. Table 4 show the effects of implementing the
reform under the different financing scenarios, in which the government sets different labour
income tax rates to specific types of workers. Column (1) is the benchmark case of the reform
financed with income taxes discussed in Section 4.2. Notice, that under this scenario there
is an increase in the labour market value of all workers, including the low-ability unskilled
workers.
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Table 4: Effects of reform on inequality under different tax scenarios
Alternative tax scenarios
Public-private wage premium Baseline (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables
Taxation
Capital tax rate 0.200 0.188 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Income tax rate
Skilled (high-ability) 0.200 0.188 0.181 0.200 0.215 0.182 0.162 0.180
Skilled (low-ability) 0.200 0.188 0.181 0.200 0.166 0.177 0.162 0.180
Unskilled (high-ability) 0.200 0.188 0.181 0.200 0.166 0.182 0.204 0.180
Unskilled (low-ability) 0.200 0.188 0.181 0.079 0.166 0.182 0.162 0.195
Unemployment rate 0.060 0.039 0.038 0.020 0.033 0.038 0.032 0.044
Consumption 3.857 +3.0% +2.3% +4.2% +2.8% +2.2% +2.9% +1.6%
Welfare Gains - 2.5% 1.7% 3.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.8% -0.3%
Labour market value of type
Skilled (high-ability) 642 +4.2% +3.8% +3.1% +0.0% +3.6% +6.6% +3.3%
Skilled (low-ability) 457 +0.1% -0.3% -0.8% +1.7% +0.0% +2.2% -0.8%
Unskilled (high-ability) 410 +2.9% +2.6% +0.9% +4.6% +2.5% +0.0% +2.5%
Unskilled (low-ability) 303 +1.4% +0.9% +9.7% +1.9% +0.9% +2.2% +0.0%
Note: model simulations under the baseline calibration, under alternative tax scenarios.
In Column (2), I maintain the capital tax constant and only reduce the labour income
tax proportionally to all worker types. In Column (3), the savings are only used to finance
a reduction of taxes for the low-ability unskilled workers. Under this scenario, their labour
market value increase by close to 10 percent. The welfare gains of 3.1 percent are actually
higher than in any of the reforms in Section 4.2, which shows that the efficiency gains of the
reform are not inconsistent with a reduction of inequality.
In columns (4)-(7), I consider the change in the labour income tax rate for a worker type,
such that its labour market value is constant and I pass on the proceedings to finance tax
reductions to other workers. In all but one scenario there is a welfare increase and a Pareto
improvement. In all scenarios, the unemployment rate is reduced by 1.6 to 2.8 percentage
points. The efficiency gains of this reform are large enough to, by using the income tax rate,
make all types better off.
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6 Conclusion
I construct a model of public sector employment with search and matching frictions and
heterogeneous workers to evaluate a reform of public sector wages that links them to the
private sector. In the model, calibrated to the United Kingdom, setting the wage of all
workers equal to those offered in the private sector reduces the unemployment rate by 1.4
percentage points.
The paper was motivated by the experience of several countries during the Eurozone crisis.
The principle of equating the distribution to the private sector could guide governments
facing budgetary pressures on how to proceed with wage cuts. Instead of progressive cuts
along the distribution, a review of pay by occupation and education is preferable to make
the whole distribution of wages closer to those in the private sector.
It was not the purpose of the paper to explain why the wages in the public sector are
higher or more compressed, but to show the implications of this policy. Given that the ben-
efits of the proposed reform are so high, understanding why governments do not implement
it becomes a paramount question. Clearly, governments must be using public sector wages
as instruments to attain other objectives.
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (2000) argue that politicians use public employment for
redistributive policies, directing income towards disadvantaged groups. This might also
justify why the distribution of wages in the public sector are so compressed and the wage
premium at the bottom so high. This policy is self-defeating. On the one hand, I show
that the wage compression increase the unemployment of workers with the lowest skills, and
that under several financing scenarios their labour market value increases with the reform.
Furthermore, Wilson (1982) shows that, from a redistributive point of view, it is optimal
for the government to increase the wage difference between skilled and unskilled worker in
order to induce more individuals to obtain education. The wage compression does precisely
the oppositive. Mitigation of inequality is a valid policy objective. But if governments want
to reduce inequality, they should use suitable instruments such as income tax or minimum
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wage. Trying to deal with the problem of inequality by only protecting an arbitrary group
of workers does not solve it and further distort the labour market.
On the other hand, the government might have more pervasive objectives. Public sector
wages are vulnerable to manipulation for electoral reasons, in the spirit of Nordhaus (1975)
political cycles. Borjas (1984) finds that, in the United States, pay rises in federal agencies
are two to three percent higher in election years. Matschke (2003) also finds a systematic
public wage increase of two to three percent prior to federal elections in Germany. One of
the reasons is the presence of stronger unions in the public sector. If the distortions in the
public sector wage are driven by political economy factors, given their cost, we should aim
to design institutions that limit the scope of politicians to manipulate public sector wages.
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